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Kurdish Women Guerrilla Fighters
by Meagan Muschara

Abstract: This article focuses on the female fighters of the PKK.
The media over the past four years have continued to report about
the female inclusion into this male dominated resistance group, the
PKK in Turkey. The addition of women to the fight spread to
various Kurdish resistance groups throughout the Middle East.
The interviews brought about a plethora of questions about
egalitarian rights for women entering the PKK. The questions that
arose are: How equal are women’s rights? Are there any
stipulations? Why are females willing to fight for the cause and
what do these women gain by fighting alongside the men? To begin
answering these questions, a brief historical background is needed
to fully understand the women’s inclusion into the PKK and the
level of equality practiced by men and women in the guerilla
group.
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Introduction

Female Kurdish Fighters Take Arms Against Islamic State Extremists.
Photo by Jan Sefti1

Mitra spent her formative years feeling oppressed by a culturally
and religiously male dominated society prior to abandoning her
family to join the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) as a guerilla
fighter. Consequently, Mitra decided that she would rather dedicate
her life to the danger of the battlefield than to live a lifetime of
oppression, welcoming and embracing the possibility of death.
Currently, Mitra is a PKK commander residing in the desolate
Qandil Mountains near the border dividing Iraq and Kurdistan.
Here, she commands and trains a unit consisting entirely of women
at a camp that holds approximately one thousand Kurdish rebels,
of which forty percent are women. Soon these women will be sent
to fight on the frontlines of Syria, and potentially Turkey, if peace
talks with the Turkish government fail. However, there is a major
stipulation to joining the PKK - both men and women are equally
1

Jan Sefti, “Female Kurdish Fighters Take Arms Against Islamic State
Extremists,” August 21, 2014, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/femalekurdish-fighters-take-arms-islamic-state-extremists/. Photo courtesy of Jan Sefti,
PBS Newshour (NPR), accessed May 10, 2015.
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prohibited from having romantic encounters. As an unwritten rule,
women fight harder than men to maintain freedom. But this does
not bother Mitra. By not thinking about men, love, or passion,
more time and energy can be dedicated towards the struggle to
create an independent Kurdish state.2
The above narrative is common among Syrian and Turkish
women who join the PKK. The PKK has been charged with
spearheading a vast movement towards gender equality that has
become popular among other Kurdish guerilla groups.
Furthermore, the female acceptance of the PKK has grown
increasingly throughout the Kurdish communities. Today it is
common for women to openly speak about gender egalitarianism
in public. On March 20, 2014, at the celebration of International
Women’s Day in Syria, Sharmiran Sham’un, the Christian deputy
of Cizire Canton Foreign Office, spoke to a massive, primarily
female crowd. Sham’un pointed out that a nation is not truly free
unless the residing women are equally free. She continued, “We
must follow Kurdish women as models, who have taken up arms to
defend their gender rights, land and honour.”3 Though Kurdish
gender equality for women has spawned somewhat from the PKK,
Kurdish women were not originally considered equal to men with
the creation of the party. Mitra, for example, explains that she had
to fight harder than men in order to prove that she was worthy of
maintaining her place in the party.4 In theory, men and women are
considered equal in the PKK, but a question remains about what
extent the PKK actually practices gender equality.
This paper will seek to uncover what gender equality truly
means for female cadres within the PKK, and to what extent
equality is practiced. As we will see, the motives for promoting
gender equality were not based on benevolence or fairness, but
rather on the party’s own ulterior motives. Gender egalitarianism
2

Jihar Gol, “Who are the Female Fighters of the PKK?” January 5, 2014,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25610424.
3
“Celebrating International Women’s Day in Syria Kurdistan,” March 20, 2014,
www.liveleak.com/wiew?i=450_1395352310.
4
Gol.
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evolved out of political necessity, as well as the desire for ethnic
and cultural preservation. The creation of gender reform under the
PKK is overshadowed by traditional Kurdish values giving the
PKK the appearance of being a liberally progressive party. The
promise of gender equality is not the only incentive for Kurdish
women to join the PKK. Kurdish women claim that there are a
multitude of factors that called them to leave their families and join
the PKK as guerilla fighters in the mountains. By offering women
an outlet from the culturally restricting customs it allows them to
continue education seemingly without gender discrimination and
the apparent freedom to enjoy equal gender and social status within
the party.
This paper will seek to assess the common narrative of
gender equality and shed light on the many restrictions women
face in comparison to their male counterparts within the PKK. It
will examine the influences and motives for women’s participation
in the movement, as well as the impact it has had on gender
egalitarianism. The research will explore if there is a lasting impact
for women rights within the Kurdish and Turkish societies and
throughout the Middle East. In doing so, this paper uses
interviews, primary and secondary documents, news articles,
books, journal articles, and documentaries to enable a historical
narrative that will determine the impact of the PKK. The guerilla
movement is constantly evolving, partly in response to outsiders’
labels of them as a terrorist group, but their goal of autonomy
remains the same. The various Kurdish groups have been
misunderstood throughout the 19th century and this research
attempts to bring an understanding to this vast group of people.
Indeed, this paper argues that despite restrictions within the
movement, the women have interestingly learned to use the male
dominated political game to their advantage for their egalitarian
ends. They seek to use the grassroots methods to patiently spread
the equal rights for women within a group to their Kurdish society
and ultimately to women throughout the Middle East. The women
of the PKK have begun a concise movement to legitimize female
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rights that if successful could change the societal structure of a
male dominated world.
The Kurdish Historical Background
A background of the Kurdish people is needed to fully understand
the discrimination of the Kurdish culture and its foundation as a
specific group of people without a home. The Kurdish people are
one of the oldest cultural groups to inhabit the Middle East and
have co-existed with various peoples throughout their history.
During the Ottoman Empire, the Kurds were considered
independent with the authority to run their own government and
practice their culture. Complications for the Kurdish people began
during the fall of the Ottoman Empire, when the partitioning of the
empire and conflicting backdoor agreements by European
imperialists created a cultural, ethnic, and ideological selfawareness throughout the Middle East. As a result, the Kurdish
people were inexplicably denied their own independent Kurdistan.
Thus, the Kurds became displaced in their own land, stretched
across a vast amount of space that includes parts of Iran, Iraq,
Turkey, and Syria. These countries in their own nationalist fervor
refuse to recognize the cultural and linguistic values of the Kurdish
people, resulting in constant prejudice and persecution.
The Kurdish mobilization towards nationalism, like all
nationalist movements, is extremely complex and full of
international controversy. There is not a single time frame in
history where the Kurds flipped the proverbial light switch to
illuminate Kurdish nationalism; the movement was gradual and
took place over a long span of time. Despite the fact that Kurdish
history can be intriguing, the totality of Kurdish history is not
necessarily relevant to understanding the purpose of this paper. A
brief background to the Kurds does however; shed light on the
progression of history in Kurdish society. This in turn will serve as
a guide to understanding the current conflict and illustrate the
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reasons as to why and how women came to be involved in the
Kurdish national struggle.
The Kurds can be dated as far back as 3000 BCE. There is
little if any doubt among scholars of Middle Eastern history that
the Kurds are one of the most ancient ethnic groups in the Middle
East. 5 Written and oral historiographies indicate that a majority of
the Kurds typically date themselves to the Median Empire of the
sixth century BCE.6 Strangely, however, the Kurds share a similar
genealogy with Persians and are often credited for being the purest
Iranians.7 However interesting this may be, Kurdish identity
(Kurdayetî) is not ethnically specific, but also takes into account
religion. 8 The development and spread of Islam throughout the
Middle East caused the Kurds, as well as many other people
groups in the Middle East, to relieve themselves of their old
religious identity and traditions and convert to the new
monotheistic religion. 9
The conversion of the Kurds to Islam is not only significant
for understanding their culture and distinctiveness in the Middle
East, but also sculpts new intrinsic values within Kurdish society.
Understanding plurality in values is essential because, in general,
the Kurdish absorption of Islam may seem like a unifying
phenomenon that would fuse tribes together. On the contrary, the
Islamic movement in Kurdistan sub-fractionalized Kurdish groups
due to the complexity stemming from the interpretation of the
Quran. In other words, despite the fact that the Kurds are a single
ethnic group under one religion, there is a differentiation among
their affiliation with various Islamic sects, namely Sunni and Shi’a.
Furthermore, Islamic traditions also define gender roles in which
women are seen as relatively unequal to men. Therefore the
5

Lokman I. Meho, Kurdish Culture and Society (Westport: Greenwood Press,
2001), 11.
6
Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq,
Turkey, and Iran (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2005), xvii.
7
Ibid., xxiii-xxiv.
8
Ibid., xxiv.
9
Ibid.
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redefining of gender and gender roles in Kurdish society, which
will be discussed later, is revolutionary, and quickly stirs up
controversy throughout Kurdistan. This is one of many causes for
the formation of ideologically mismatched jigsaw pieces in the
otherwise potentially contiguous and independent Kurdistan.
Culturally, Shi’a Kurds and Persians hold a relationship of
relatively mutual respect for one another, while Sunni Kurds and
Sunni Arabs West of Iran have a turbulent and volatile
relationship.10 Religion also paved the way for the political identity
which was mainly impacted by the Ottoman Empire. This is to say
that religion and specific groups were given higher status in the
empire and eventually the religious sectors in the Ottoman
government would undermine the ruling power of the caliphate
system since the empire was partially dictated by religious law.
There was no separation of religion and state.
Though the Kurds have endured centuries of various
fluctuating empires, none impacted the modern Kurds as much as
the Ottoman Empire and the nations that subsequently inherited
them following the empire’s fatal collapse. Early Ottoman history
with the Kurds may initially seem mundane in relation to the
modern Kurdistan, but Ottoman policies actually laid the
groundwork for the future of the Kurds and their persecution. The
Ottomans divided their empire into sub-regions under what is
known as the millet system. Instead of strictly dissecting the
empire on an ethnic basis, the Ottomans primarily focused on
subdividing the land on religious affiliation, Muslim, or nonMuslim. In addition, it should be noted that the Ottoman
government also put into consideration the complex linguistic and
tribal entities of the empire to inhibit conflict. Since the Kurds
were Muslim, they were at a political and societal advantage under
the millet system, and were referred to as boz millet, “the gray
nation,”11 while non-Muslim groups were millet-i mahkume, or
“dominated people,” and given less autonomy in their millets.12 On
10

Ibid.
Ibid., 1.
12
Ibid., 2.
11
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the other hand, Muslim groups such as the Kurds were millet-i
hakime, “dominate people,” and enjoyed a greater autonomy
within their millets, and a less discriminatory integration into
Ottoman politics.13
However, the Kurds lost some of their autonomy when the
Porte (Ottoman parliament) began establishing the Tanzimat
reforms (reorganization) beginning roughly around 1839 and
lasting until 1876.14 This was an overhaul of the outdated political
system in an attempt to prevent the empire from collapsing. The
economy in Western Europe was expanding due to colonialism,
and the Ottoman Empire was closely watching the successful
European nations in order to gain some insight on how to preserve
the empire. Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire attempted to become
more “European.” Many empires during the colonial era used the
European model of westernization in order to survive and keep up
with the new demands of a beginning globalized economy. For
example, the Tanzimat period included a revamping of the
Ottoman legal system, Mejelle, by emulating the French civil code
while still maintaining Islamic principles upheld through shari’ah
law, a legal system based on the ethics within the Quran.15 The
destruction of the millet system also directly affected the Kurds. In
1839 Rashid Pasha issued a decree, the Hatt-i Sharif of Gülhane,
which stated reforms for all of those living within the Ottoman
Empire regardless of religion.16 Then in 1856, the Hatt-i Hümayan
decree greatly emphasized that all Ottoman subjects would be
made equal.17 Finally in 1869, the Nationality Law was enacted
which granted equal citizenship to all Ottoman subjects.18 This was
done by way of giving control to governors who were elected by

13

Ibid., 2.
Ibid., 5.
15
William L. Cleveland and Martin Burton, A History of the Modern Middle
East, 4th edition (Westview Press, 2009), 84.
16
Ibid., 83.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
14
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the Porte.19 The Kurds only lost little autonomy, and were still able
to maintain their local political systems under Kurdish shayks and
aghas (chiefs).20
Following the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire
was disassembled which created a domino effect of nationalism
throughout the Middle East that greatly affected the Kurds.
Nationalism spread throughout the Middle East after WWI for
many reasons. One factor had been the world powers and their
ideological influences in each area of the Past Ottoman Empire.
Each group that fought for a side was promised their own
autonomy away from the Ottomans and had been influenced by
ideologies from Russia, Great Britain, America, France, and
Greece and the other colonial powers. Another factor was that
many leading figures from the Middle East after WWI had a
western education and learned about the ideology of nationalism.
They noted how uniting a state could be achieved if everyone in an
autonomous state were bound by borders and a common national
identity. A rising power needed the acceptance of the western
world for protection and legitimacy. Specifically, the establishment
of Turkey created a new world of uniformed identity that all
citizens were required to adhere to the Kemal Reforms which were
successful because the Tanzimat Reforms had set a precedent.
Since the 100 years of Tanzimat Reforms weakened the religious
sects of government, Muslims and non-Muslims gained equality in
an empire that was losing control to the invading colonialists. The
Ottoman reforms allowed for a Western shift in the empire that set
the foundation for acceptance of future reforms in Turkey.

19
20

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Establishment of Turkey21
The fall of the Ottoman Empire resulted in a profound sense of
cultural, ethnic and ideological self-awareness throughout the
Middle East. When the victors of World War I divided the Middle
East into distinct regions, the Kurdish people were inexplicably
denied their own independent Kurdistan. Thus, the Kurds are
spread across a vast amount of space that includes parts of Iran,
Iraq, Turkey, and Syria. These countries have their own idea of
nationalism and refuse to recognize the cultural and linguistic
values of the Kurdish people. As such, the Kurds are under
constant prejudice and persecution by the country in which they
reside. The Kurdish people formed several resistance groups in
response to this on-going struggle for nationalism. The
establishment of Turkey specifically altered the lives of the
Kurdish people under their control.
The nineteenth century, consisted of European powers
meddling within areas of the Middle East to control resources by
establishing colonies which weakened the Ottoman Empire. The
Allied powers continued to influence the Middle East post-World
War I by dismantling the Ottoman Empire through the Treaty of
Sèrves granting the Allied forces self-determination for some and
allowing western powers to claim territories for their strategic
influence. The Secret agreements had been circulating among
Britain, France, Russia, Greece, and Italy and were defined in the
Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The agreements would distribute
borders to the allies and form a divided Middle East in search of
various nationalisms. The Treaty divided Anatolia between Italy
21

The history of Turkey has directly affected the fundamental actions of the
PKK and contributed to the issue of gender equality. For this reason, Turkey
will be the focus of the research as it is in direct conflict with the PKK. Mustafa
Kemal or “Ataturk,” the leading figure for significant reforms within Turkey,
was also the main contributor of opposition towards the Kurds. The Kemalist
Reforms were intended to secularize Turkey and were initiated by Ataturk.
Ataturk’s reforms attempted to create a loyal and uniformed state by creating
only Turkish citizens. This prohibited the practice of any other culture that could
possibly undermine a uniformed Turkish state.
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and France, creating an independent Armenian state, and granted
Greece territory that neared Istanbul. Among the agreements was
the promise of a sovereign Kurdistan for the Kurdish population of
the Ottoman Empire. The Society for the Ascension of Kurdistan
(Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti) sent Serif Pasha22as their representative
at the conference to discuss their claims to a bordered territory.
The Kurdish representatives were divided as they could not agree
on where Kurdistan should reside. However, the Treaty of Sèrves
in Section III Articles 62-6423 defined Kurdistan within the Mosul
Provence. The treaty outlined an autonomous state for the Kurdish
people, but the subsequent Treaty of Lausanne nixed any hope for
a Kurdish state in Turkey. Ultimately, the Treaty of Sèrves
restricted what was left of the Ottoman Empire and put allied
commissions and governmental finances under allied control. The
Istanbul government signed the treaty in 1920 to cut bonds with
Turkish and non-Turkish areas that were awarded to the European
victors, but the European powers were met with opposition.
Turkish resistance groups comprised of militia units and
guerilla fighters formed in an attempt to stop the division of
Turkish territory. The rebel forces called themselves Societies for
the Defense of Rights and formed to protect their land from the
aims of the treaty and to begin their national war for independence
in 1919, with the prior Ottoman field commander as their
organizing leader.24 The national movement for Turkish
sovereignty was led by Mustafa Kemal who easily asserted his
leadership. The Istanbul government, aware of Kemal’s plans,
revoked his official stance as an army officer in 1920, making him
a rebel leader who opposed the legitimacy of the Istanbul
22

Hakan Özoğlu, Kurdish Notables and the Ottoman State: Evolving Identities,
Competing Loyalties, and Shifting Boundaries (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 2004), 112.
23
“The treaty of peace between the allied and associated powers, 1995-2012,”
Hellenic Resources Network, accessed May 19, 2014,
http://www.hri.org/docs/sevres/part3.html.!
24
James L. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East (Oxford: Oxford Univerity Press,
2011), 179.
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government. Kemal was dismissed as an army officer because he
wished to protect Turkish land from the encroaching Greeks which
went against the government and only heightened the fact that
Istanbul no longer protected Turkish interests. This in turn,
motivated the unification of Turkey, led by Kemal, and the
overthrow of the Istanbul government. Kemal understood that he
needed to legitimize his movement for Turkish sovereignty by
creating a new Turkish government to replace the Istanbul
government with proper representation in 1920. The process of
establishing a government took place in Ankara, where the rebels
chose their body of representatives that included members from the
prior Ottoman parliament. The newly formed government was
known as the Grand National Assembly, who then nominated
Mustafa Kemal as their president. The National Assembly idolized
Kemal and renamed him Ataturk which meant “the father of the
Turks” in 1935.25 The national assembly adopted the Western
principles of popular sovereignty accompanied with a constitution.
The establishment of a constitutional Turkish government and the
invasion of Armenia, with aid from the Soviet Union, was the first
step towards disassembling the Treaty of Sevres.26 Ataturk
considered the newly independent Armenia to be Turkish land and
therefore invalid as an Armenian state. The territorial gains
allowed Turkey the advantage to fight off the Greek invasion. The
Greek forces became a threat to the new government as they
invaded the prior Ottoman capital of Bursa and breached Anatolia
in 1921.27 In the same year, France and the Soviet Union
acknowledged Turkey as a legitimate state leading to the Italian
withdrawal from Anatolia. The second strike to the treaty was the
Turkish nationalist defeat of the Greek troops in a three week
battle at Sakarya in 1922, which left Ataturk victorious with his
goals nearly achieved.
25

Hugh Poulton, Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and
the Turkish Republic (New York: New York University Press, 1997).
26
Gelvin, 179.
27
Ibid.
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The achievements by Ataturk’s forces led to a renegotiation
of the Treaty of Sèrves in the Lausanne Conference of 1922. In the
conference, Ataturk demanded recognition from the British for
complete Turkish Sovereignty and to abolish the Sultanate, which
would eliminate the caliphate’s role as a source of political power.
That strategic act would completely eliminate the Ottoman past
and authority, allowing the National Assembly full legitimate
control of Turkey. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed in 1923,
officially recognizing Turkey as an independent nation state by the
international community.
After Ataturk accomplished his goal of a sovereign Turkey,
the next step was to establish Turkey as a uniform nation. He
achieved this by carrying out a series of reforms that would result
in a controlled and lasting state with a common Turkish identity.
The Kemalist Reforms (Ataturkism) of Turkey were a set of
reforms that were based on European nationalism and are seen in
six distinct sections to unify the state under a sole Turkish identity.
Understanding the cataclysm of the reforms is vital to
comprehending the current conflict between the Kurdish rebels and
Turkey. Ataturk’s reforms contained two purposes for Turkey; one
was to Westernize Turkey for its future inclusion into the European
world stage for legitimacy and to unify the country through a
common identity known as “Turkification” which took on the form
of nationalism. The Kemalist reforms had drastic effects on dual
populations that existed in the land before the establishment of
Turkey. The reforms of Ataturk were successful because of the
constant state of reforms of the Ottoman Empire (Tanzimat
Reforms) during the nineteenth century. The prior reforms allowed
the Kemalist Reforms a precedent to follow and allowed for a large
acceptance of the changes being promoted in Turkey. The
establishment of secularism, through the reforms, brought by far
the most significant change in Turkey.
The introduction of secularism tremendously impacted
Turkish society and entailed multiple changes for the state.
Ataturk’s policy of secularism was passed by the National
Assembly’s vote in 1924 to abolish the Caliphate system. Ataturk
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understood that by exiling the Ottoman royal families (Caliphs)
that generational Islamic traditions would be exiled with them. The
reforms also dismantled the religious organizations that protected,
taught and aided the Islamic traditions. In 1926, the Swiss Civil
Code outlawed the Mejelle and the Shari’ah authority, replacing it
with new penal and commercial restrictions. The legal codes
banned polygamy and granted women access to divorce, which
extinguished the Ulama’s elitist stance in government matters. The
civil codes embodied Western values of secularism to replace the
traditional laws of religion, as interpreted from the Quran, which
shifted the power base to the secularist state officials and away
from the religious authorities.28
The reforms also dissolved the Sufi orders by prohibiting
their worship at shrines and tombs, making it a criminal offense in
1925. The tradition of wearing a Fez in public areas was a link to
the Ottoman past and, to destroy the Ottoman hold on Turkey, the
Fez was made illegal to wear in public. Instead, the Fez was
replaced by Western hats in 1925 to symbolize Turkey’s ‘civilized’
Westernization. The reforms of Ataturk went further to resemble a
Western nation by replacing the Muslim lunar calendar with the
Western Gregorian calendar in 1926. In order for Turkey to keep
up with the world markets they implemented a Western calendar,
which included the adoption of Sunday as a day of rest instead of
their traditional Friday. To further secularize, the state
commissioned the translation of the Quran from Arabic to Turkish
in 1932. The translation of God’s direct words was highly
controversial and seen as altering its important meanings. The
reforms also stated that public prayers would change to Turkish
instead of Arabic. The main purpose for the secularist section of
reforms was to rid Turkey of the Islamic power base that could
compete for control in Turkey, as it did during the Ottoman period.
The second was to eliminate the Ottoman past to create an allencompassing Turkish identity.

28

Ibid.
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For Ataturk, the promotion of nationalism was an attempt
to unite the people. In doing so, he would create a sense of loyalty
to the state by implementing complete “Turkification” through
symbols of one cultural identity for citizens of the state. To further
the unification of Turkey, language reform was implemented in
1928. Ataturk commissioned an organization to produce a Turkish
alphabet using Latin to replace the existing Arabic alphabet. The
aim was to completely disassemble the Ottoman past from future
generations by only promoting a Turkish past and a Turkish
identity. In a way, the reforms emphasized Turkey as a completely
united nation. This was in stark, contrast to the instability of the
region under Ottoman and Islamic rule, and gave leaders the
legitimacy to claim it as a sovereign state. The unification of
Turkey was achieved through influence, education, and the
opportunity for social and governmental involvement.
The populist reforms created establishments of “People’s
Houses” throughout Turkey which promoted adult education and
political ideology to inform the citizens of the reforms that would
better the country. The grassroots efforts to inform the Turkish
citizens through state institutions created feelings among citizens
of equal participation in government affairs.
The mixture of populism and nationalism went further with
the reforms in education. Ataturk saw education as an important
foundation to create a lasting state. The literacy and knowledge of
a state was gained through education and would be essential for a
strong Turkish Republic. The main idea for education was again to
break away from the Ottoman past by dissolving the tradition of an
elitist education system and implementing a free mandatory
elementary schooling system throughout Turkey. In the rural areas,
educational efforts would prove difficult for various reasons.
Nonetheless, between 1923 and 1940, schools and teachers
doubled and the number of enrolled students increased by 300
percent.29

29

Ibid.
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The reforms also affected the social roles of Turkish
women through gender equality. The aim of the broadened equality
between the sexes was to resemble the freedoms that European
women possessed. The reforms advanced women on the social
sphere by allowing them mandatory access to education to acquire
the skills to work in Turkish society alongside men. The snowball
effect allowed for thirteen female judges by 1933, women were
also granted the right to vote by 1934, and there were seventeen
female delegates in the national assembly by 1935.30
The reforms greatly aided the state economically and are
important to the history of Turkey, but the above reforms
mentioned specifically affected the Kurds in Turkey. Ataturk’s
reforms helped to establish a uniform Turkish state, whose drastic
changes directly affected the Kurdish people. The new borders of
Turkey as defined by the Treaty of Lausanne served as a direct
antithesis to the Treaty of Sevres as the Kurds were not able to
obtain an independent Kurdistan. With the promise of their own
independent state squashed by yet another foreign influence, the
Kurds were left desperately grasping for a solidified identity in the
region and so formed oppositional factions within the newly
formed Turkey.
The first Kurdish nationalist movement arose against the
Turkish Republic in 1923 and another in 1925. The uprisings were
a mixture of Kurdish protest along with Islamic revivalism.31 The
rebellions were severely dealt with and ended with Ataturk
attempting to cleanse the Kurdish ethnic history from Turkey. The
reforms were intended to create one national group that consisted
of only a Turkish population and left no room for any other
identity. The intention was to strip the Kurds and others of their
ethnic cultures by outlawing their languages, clothes, practices and
subsequently placing them among the lowest class in the Turkish
society. It was against the law for the Kurds to practice their own
culture. In the new democracy, it became mandatory for all young
30
31

Ibid.
Ibid.
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citizens of Turkey to attend school in efforts to re-educate the
masses. The schools preached a Western curriculum and promoted
Turkish nationalism. Ataturk believed education that promoted
Turkish history and vernacular would lead to faster assimilation of
nationalism. Unforeseen by Kemal was the outcome education
would have on the population who learned about ideology and how
the legality of a republic should work.
Formation of the PKK32
The Turkish education system limited its participants primarily to
those who were Turkish which created a class of wealthy elites.
These elites eventually became aware of the political ideals of
democracy and its promotion of certain humanitarian rights that
the Turkish government denied. They learned how to protest on a
legal basis and soon began to oppose the unjust treatment of
specific groups by the government, which in turn ignited sparks of
nationalism bolstered through the creation of various political
parties. The educated elites gave backing to the military coup of
1960 and created a liberal period with a new constitution. Aliza
Marcus in her book, Blood and Belief, wrote that the contents of
the newly drafted constitution manifested “Freedoms to form
associations, publish, organize trade unions, and the ability to call
strikes.”33 These new values gave rise to the many political parties
controlled by Turkish and Kurdish activists. Kurdish activism now
consisted of a new generational wave that did not experience the
punitive end of the first Kurdish nationalist movement of the
32

Not all Kurds agree on the approach for independence nor do they agree on
the end product. These Kurdish factions each have varying ideologies in their
respective countries. The Yekêtiy Nîştimaniy Kurdistan, Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) of Iraq, the Partiya Demokrata Kurdistanê, Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP) of Iraq and the Turkish group Devrimci Yol (DEVYOL) which translates to Revolutionary Path were some of the major regional
opponents of the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistani, PKK in Turkey also known as the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party.
33
Aliza Marcus, Blood and Belief The PKK and the Kurdish Fight (New York
and London: New York University Press, 2007), 17.
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1920s. The new generation differed from the old as they were
better educated with redefined notions of freedom and new
avenues by which to obtain it. At the same time, the poverty
stricken Kurdish populations in rural areas began to migrate into
urban areas in hopes of creating a better livelihood. The move to
cities then created a surge of activists from various political arenas.
In 1961, the first legally organized political party that
caught Kurdish attention was the Turkish Workers Party (TIP).
The socialist ideology of the party promoted social and economic
equality of the classes. The Kurds soon involved themselves within
TIP, and paper media based on cultural aspects, in addition to the
Kurdish language, began to be distributed. Unfortunately for the
activists, the newly ensconced liberal leadership of the Turkish
Workers Party was shut down after being charged for being a
separatist party. One after another, legal parties began to be shut
down or closely monitored.
During the 1960s, a rebellious Kurdish identity swelled
and became a major influence on the preeminent Kurdish
independence champion, Abdullah Öcalan, endearingly referred to
by his followers as Apo. In the late 1960s, students and workers
called meetings to demonstrate their democratic rights by
protesting the oppression of their cultural identity. Many of the
young groups had been influenced by their teachers, who were
Kurdish nationalists and were well immersed in the Kurdish
culture since their youth and thus viewed the suppression of their
culture as cruelly unfair. Some Kurds, on the other hand, fell under
the influence of the radical leftist movements of the 1960s.
Öcalan was raised in the primarily Kurdish, rural and
impoverished city of Şanliurfa, inside Turkey’s borders. His family
was poor, and his mother would often times publicly humiliate his
father for not being able to sufficiently support his family. While
attending school, Öcalan had to walk an hour to and from school.
His childhood dream was to become a Turkish army officer, but he
later failed the military school exam. Instead, he went to vocational
school in Ankara and studied work related to the state land registry
in 1966. This move influenced Öcalan as he saw the Kurdish
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identity through speeches at meetings. By 1969, he worked in a
government office that oversaw the measuring of land for deeds.
During this time, Turkey had been in turmoil politically and,
though hesitant, Öcalan knew something had to be done.
Coincidentally he turned to a book with new ideas entitled, The
Alphabet of Socialism.
Öcalan began to understand the issues through socialist
ideology and proclaimed himself as a socialist.34 Later in 1972, he
would be arrested and spent time in prison for attending a
demonstration. While incarcerated, Öcalan listened to a wide span
of political ideologies in regards to the causes, effects, and actions
needed for a revolution. He remained silent, while listening to
assessments made by imprisoned activists, and was able to realize
that various organizations went through legal means in order to
reach their goals. They believed hostile action could be useful, but
only after gaining sufficient legitimacy and wide support. Öcalan
did not understand their views as he felt the legal avenue in Turkey
was corrupt. The political parties throughout the 1960s and 1970s
had been monitored and shut down each time to take away their
legitimacy. Öcalan’s assessment of prior attempts through the legal
system in Turkey inspired an ideological shift on how to attain
Kurdish independence.
The primary facets of Öcalan’s path to Kurdish
independence consisted of ridding the region of all remnants of
colonialism, terrors of imperialism, and the implementation of the
socialist ideologies from figures such as Marx, Lenin and Mao. His
speeches tended to be long-winded and passionate. He engaged in
debates about which socialist revolution to imitate; Lenin or Mao.
He believed that debate on the economic and social position of
Turkey should be relevant and that aggressive socialist action
would inspire a concurrent nationalist element.
While trying to figure out which revolutionary model to
follow, one idea still remained constant among those of Lenin and
Mao; there was a need for an armed coup, the question was its
34
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timing. The parties differed on which stage the fight should be
used. Öcalan believed that an armed struggle would legitimize the
Kurdish stance and would allow them to gain followers. Though
Kurdish nationals agreed on creating an independent Kurdistan,
they did not agree on a single political dogma. They were divided
over which leftist ideology to follow, not just in regards to Maoist,
Leninist, but also on other fundamental leftist groupings. The
division of ideology was useless in Öcalan’s eyes but, rather than
let ideology divide the movement, Öcalan believed it was better to
unite in an armed coup. “‘If a people embraces its own tradition,
uses its own language and makes it [sic] culture come alive, this
too is a rebellion,’ … ‘but the highest form of rebellion is armed
rebellion.’ said Öcalan in his 1977 speech in Elazig, a speech
which became the basis for the group’s first published pamphlet on
its ideology.”35
Öcalan could not gain support from the wide range of
Kurdish independence parties as they disagreed that an armed coup
was the necessary first step to legitimacy. This problem created a
division that prolonged gaining support. The remedy to the
problem, in regards to Öcalan and his followers, was to eliminate
the various Kurdish parties. Attacking other groups was the first
armed struggle for the PKK. They believed by eliminating their
political rivals, the PKK would be the lone and unopposed Kurdish
independence party. This strategy was based on the Leninist rule
and the Maoist philosophy of eliminating other factions to create a
single imperative party. The PKK’s decision to attack and
eliminate other Kurdish independence movements would prove to
be a major thorn in the side of the PKK moving forward. It
developed into a major diplomatic hurdle in garnering support
from outside of Turkey.
The formation of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
became official on November 28, 1978. They formed a central
committee that contained three people; Abdullah Öcalan, Sahin
Donmez, and Cemil Bayik. The party also included a Regional
35
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Preparations Committee with members spread out across Turkey.
They were asked to stay employed by the state for information,
while also acquiring new recruits. Some members quit their jobs to
penetrate trade unions and attack other parties.36 The beginnings of
the PKK came to a halt following the economic collapse of
Turkey. This led the military to go on a rampage and cleanse any
opposition to their power. Öcalan fled from Turkey to Syria,
leaving the PKK without a leader. The location was initially used
as a gathering spot for ideas and PKK members. In Syria, Öcalan
played the old Kurdish card of pitting neighboring states against
each other for Kurdish preservation.
At this time, Syria was a location where various groups
could escape oppression. Once in Syria, Öcalan encountered many
leftist Palestinian groups whom were sympathetic to his socialist
agenda. In Damascus, the groups agreed to help the PKK, but
informed Syrian intelligence services of the PKK’s arrival. The
Syrian government was fully aware of the continued arrival of the
Turkish Kurds into their country and distributed fake identity cards
with Arab names. The acceptance of fake identification by the
government was their protection against questions on allowing
Turkish PKK members into Syria. That concept would eliminate
evidence linking Syrian aid to the Kurdish rebels. The government
allowed the Kurdish Turks into Syria because the two countries
had ongoing complications. For example by harboring Turkish
Kurds, Syria was able to use the PKK as a distraction against
Turkey. One factor for the tensions were that both countries
claimed the former jurisdiction of Alexandretta as their own, but
officially it was absorbed by Turkey in 1939 after a referendum.
Syria was distressed about Turkey’s GAP dam project. The dams
harnessed water from the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for domestic
purposes. Originating in Turkey, the rivers stem for miles,
streaming through Syria and Iraq. The dam project would give
Turkey’s capital, Ankara, abundant control of the water before
reaching the arid Syrian climate. It was believed Turkey had been
36
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harboring an opposition military group, the Muslim Brothers, who
launched attacks against Syria. In size, Syria is five times smaller
than Turkey and bordered at that time by the Soviet Union. Turkey
was a member of NATO and an ally to the United States, as such,
the Western powers would align with Turkey militarily and Syria
was painfully aware of this. Thus, the arrival and militant training
of PKK members was encouraged. Syria used the PKK as a proxy
to cause regional conflict for their problematic neighbor. The
Kurdish party held similar notions about Turkey and their
operations matched Syrian interests. In this instance, the Kurds
used the disputing neighboring countries for their preservation.37
The Kurdish people have a long-standing history of using their
enemy’s enemies for their advantage and self-preservation.
The admittance of Turkish Kurds into Syria was
conditional. This is to say that the Turkish Kurds could not
advocate uprisings regarding the Syrian Kurds. The conditional
allowance of the PKK into Syria was followed with care because
Öcalan had discovered his long-term goal in Syria for the PKK.
While in Syria, the PKK met with another occupied people
fighting for their independence, the Palestinians. The Palestinian
groups in Lebanon and Syria received the PKK members with
open arms and even trained them in guerrilla warfare.
The DFLP (Democratic Front for the Liberation of
Palestine), during the 1980s, was one of the largest Palestinian
groups under the umbrella of the greater PLO (Palestinian
Liberation Organization). Mamdoh Nofal, the former military
leader in the DFLP explained, “We accept the Marxist-Leninist
groups because we are Marxist-Leninist, we are revolutionaries
and we support the revolutionary movement.”38 Nofal met with
Abu Laila (Qais Abdul-Karim) a political leader in the DFLP.
They agreed to take a small number of the group to train. The
training started during the 1980s in Helwe. The PKK learned about
explosives, military tactics, topography, artillery, and guerilla
37
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tactics.39 Unfortunately for the PKK, funds ran too low for the
DFLP to continue fully supporting the group. The PKK then
sought help elsewhere. Aid came from a plethora of Palestinian
and communist groups: Yasser Arafat of Fatah, George Habash of
the PFLP (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine), Samir
Ghoshesh of the Palestinian Popular Struggle Front (PPSF or PSF),
and the Lebanese Communist Party.40 In return the Kurds helped
build fortifications and agreed to fight on the front line to defend
against potential attacks from Israel. The PKK and other militants
were pushed north following the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon.
Öcalan’s interest then shifted to Northern Iraq as it was the
ideal location for the PKK to set up camp. The territory, known as
Üçgen (Turkish for triangle) was a long stretch of land that saddled
the Iran, Turkey, and Iraq borders. The location was ideal for the
members to enter into Turkey freely, stage attacks, and then exit
when needed. Syria offered a great safe haven for the PKK, but not
for attempting attacks. The path from Turkey to Syria was on flat
land and party members did not want to draw attention to Syria, by
aggravating Turkey. The geographical location borrowed by the
PKK could easily be compromised and Syria, through harboring
the PKK, could be seen as provoking Turkey. To achieve the goal
of launching attacks in Turkey, Öcalan needed to make peace with
the Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) who controlled the
coveted area in the mountainous region bordering Turkey. The
KDP and surrounding parties were in a constant state of
competition and disunity with one another in an attempt to obtain
control of the region. Thus Öcalan reached out to Massoud
Barzani, leader of the KDP. Massoud Barzani’s father, Mulla
Mustafa Barzani, was too conservative in Öcalan’s eyes. He held
on to old feudalistic ideas, and Öcalan harshly criticized Mulla
Mustafa Barzani because of this. In November 1979, Massoud
Barzani inherited control of the KDP following his father’s death.
Öcalan put priorities ahead of ideology, which proved to be
39
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diplomatically advantageous. Barzani agreed to put aside Öcalan’s
past criticism of Barzani’s father and allowed Öcalan to enter KDP
territory. By 1982, Iran and Iraq were at war and the KDP turned
on Saddam Hussein, which in turn forced many to relocate and left
new alliances open for consideration.
Öcalan used the situation in Iraq to his advantage and
moved to form an alliance with Barzani. The intentions for the
location were not seen as temporary for Öcalan, but as a permanent
spot for the PKK. In 1982, an agreement was reached with Barzani
to allow the PKK to use the bordering territory. The PKK was
granted space to build camps in Northern Iraq and to freely cross
the borders into Turkey. In Syria, the party learned to use and
make weapons in guerrilla warfare, but in Northern Iraq the PKK
became knowledgeable with survival in the mountains as a
guerrilla power.
Turkey and the PKK
The establishment of Turkey and the creation of the PKK are
interesting narratives that should be crossed examined for
similarities. The two entities have been at odds with each other for
more than three decades each trying to outwit the other by taking
on the similar roles as a counterpart to become just as legitimate in
their cause. Both leaders of each nationalist movement were rebels
of the state. Ataturk’s success of becoming a legitimate force of
winning his sovereign Turkey can be seen as a product of that
time. The atmosphere after WWI left many throughout the world
in complete devastation leaving many world powers absent of the
will to fight off Ataturk and his forces. Thus, Ataturk won Turkish
sovereignty without much opposition. Apo created the Kurdish
movement in a different time where Turkey now had international
support, an established government, and an army to stop such a
potential threat leaving Apo’s goal out of reach.
Both leading figures of the movement were beloved by
their followers, leaving a lasting impact on each community.
Ataturk known as the father of Turkey and Apo known as the
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father of the PKK created a power base that left no room for
oppositions in beliefs, ideology, and a cultural co-existence.
Ataturk created a uniformed culture crushing any opposing system
that threated Turkishness, even to the extent of cultural genocide.
Apo created an absolute power base by manipulating situations to
create beneficial circumstances for his goals that include his
switching alliances with various Kurdish resistance groups, murder
of opposing groups and PKK party members that eventually
showed opposition to Apo’s decisions, he altered their socialist
ideology to a democratic system, and even the inclusion of women
as we will examine later.
Apo states that he is against Turkey and all it inhabits, but
uses methods that are vastly similar to his opponent. It would seem
that Apo learned from Ataturk’s methods to attempt the same goals
that Ataturk gained from in 1923, essentially to “out Turk the
Turks”. As we learned and will further explore, the PKK has used
and continues to use techniques similar to Turkey in order to gain
international support and awareness to their goal of an independent
Kurdistan. The interesting aspect is that the female PKK members
are using the party methods to establish egalitarianism for women
that will last long after the PKK is gone.
Öcalan’s Views on Women
Öcalan harbored views on women differently from the culture
around him. As a young boy, he remembered watching his mother
humiliate his father. She was very harsh and critical of her son. He
was also influenced by his sisters’ marriage to a man from a
neighboring village. His sister Havva was traded for wheat and
money. Marriage arrangements did not contain aspects of love but
rather the decisions were made by the parents who would profit
from the arrangement. Aliza Marcus states in, Blood and Belief,
“Öcalan later explained he saw such marriages as a type of death
for women, and former PKK ideologue and scribe Mehmet Can
Yuce cited Havva’s marriage as a major influence on Öcalan’s
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theories on the need to liberate women from the repressive roles
inherent in traditional Kurdish male-female relations.”41
The first emerging female within the PKK was Öcalan’s
wife, Kersire Yildrim. They married in 1978, after meeting at a
journalism school. He received much criticism from his party for
the union. They did not agree with her family links and believed
that any relationship with women would bring needless distractions
that would take away from their fight. Author Aliza Marcus noted
an interview with a leading member of the PKK on the subject of
relationships and party members, “PKK supporters viewed
marriage as a bourgeois undertaking that weakened people’s
commitment to the fight. ‘From the beginning there was a rule
against marrying, or maybe not a rule, but it was an idea, a way of
thinking,’ said Selahattin Celik, a leading PKK member. “Love
was something for the small bourgeois, something unnecessary.”
None the less, a number of PKK’s first members were married –
some, like Öcalan, married other supporters – but the pressures of
illegal life made it hard to maintain.”42
The whole party began to understand the idea of marriage
as a distraction and became a rule for all later members of the party
both male and female. It was believed that if a member was
married their focus would shift on family instead of the struggle.
Öcalan attempted to justify his marriage in terms of helping her
independence. He explained their marriage would allow her
freedom to move around Kurdish regions freely, since unmarried
women were not permitted to travel alone. He also alluded to the
idea that it would free her from family because they were linked to
the state.
Much of the PKK’s ideology came from Öcalan and
integrating women into the party was one aspect they adopted. If
we analyze the leader’s view of women it becomes clear as to why
he allocated women into their movement. Throughout Öcalan’s
life, he had been influenced by strong women and admitted to
41
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being afraid of them at times. He felt this was exemplary
leadership material to cause fear and believed that women were
more organized than men as members. The three impacting women
in his life had been; his mother, his wife, and his beloved sister. He
viewed his mother and wife as strong and capable of making an
impact with their actions, he also saw his sister as a woman
needing to be liberated. He detested the property theme of women
and wanted to empower them away from a feudal hierarchy. He
associated feudal life as a western approach to stay in power by
keeping the rural population embedded in past ideas. His Maoist
and Leninist approach needed a one party rule with everyone at an
equal level. The ideology did not leave room for inequality and
opposition of old cultural and religious practices. He had many
thoughts on the subject but never attempted to put them in use until
it was needed. Apo essentially brought women recruits into the
PKK as a way to fill positions and to keep Kurdish women from
changing their cultural identity to a Turkish one. The state of
Turkey, through their reforms, was able to gain female support
since it allowed gendered freedoms which were denied to them
living in their Kurdish villages. The Kurdish women were granted
the ability to enjoy a form of equality through activism in the PKK.
Formation of Women Activism
Women from various ethnic sectors in the area of Turkey served an
important purpose during the World Wars and the War for Turkish
Independence. They joined the fight as nurses on the battlefield,
suppliers of materials, seamstresses for the men’s uniforms, and
the economic base during the wars. Women became the economic
foundation for society as they took on the position of the male role
in domestic life during the wars aiding the nostalgia of equal
gender roles. Kurdish women in Turkey have been influenced by
the 1923 decision to remodel the Turkish republic. Ataturk
implemented reforms, as stated earlier, that would modernize
Turkey to resemble Western Europeans. The end goal was to be
recognized as an independent state in Western eyes, which meant
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adopting democracy. One aspect of becoming a sovereign Turkey
was to make all males and females equal under law. Kemal
decided to establish women’s rights through law which included
social, legal, and political rights.
Only few women from elite families were chosen to receive
equal education as men did and they competed for the same job
opportunities. This emancipation created more difficulties for
women because it gave the impression that all women were
liberated, when most were not. In the article by Meltem MuftulerBac entitled, “Turkish Women’s Predicament,” the author states:
“This created two types of women in Turkish society: the open,
western, emancipated woman and the closed, traditional,
“unliberated” women.”43 This is directly relevant to the study of
outside ideas that had influence on the Kurdish culture in reference
to true gender equality within the female gender as seen from a
male perspective. The vast majority of Kurdish women resided in
the underdeveloped Kurdish villages in Southeastern Turkey. The
social structures of the various societies and cultures within Turkey
create multiple inequalities and prejudices that influence their
gendered identity.
The Kurdish society contained disadvantages for their
women with male dominated customs, methodical economic
advances to men, political violence, and danger from living in
conflict zones overtaken by PKK and the Turkish forces. As
Zeynep Sahin states in her dissertation, “The Political
Representation of Kurdish, Kemalist, and Conservative Muslim
Women in Turkey (1990-2010),” Kurdish women have been
placed within, “systematic inequalities resulting from a lack of
access to education, legal services, and health services. Worsened
by language barriers, low levels of education, as well as low levels
of employment outside of their homes among adult women in
Southeastern Turkey, leave Kurdish women more vulnerable than
other women in Turkey.”44
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Oppressive policies of marital law between 1980 and 1987
in Turkey had especially affected the Kurdish people which called
Turkey to a state of emergency within the states lawmaking
procedures from 1987 to 2002.45 The legislative procedures were
enacted due to the high levels of domestic violence and honor
killings in the private sphere of Kurdish provinces.46
Kurdish women questioned the restrictive actions by the
Turkish government through various forms of resistance that did
not always include an armed struggle. Many Kurdish women
formed levels of resistance through their political positions. They
formed organizations that protested the lack of human rights for
Kurds in Turkey in order to bring awareness to the “Kurdish
question” from the international community. Sahin states that
“forms of state violence against women have included sexual
assault, rape, and torture exercised by state agents such as security
forces, police, and village guards. Sometimes women were forced
to witness the torture or murder of male relatives. Ill treatment of
women by state agents was used as a strategy of demoralizing the
Kurdish community.”47 Female Kurds experienced a “double
oppression” that shaped the Kurdish response of resistance of the
1980’s to the modern day.48
The Turkish state during the military coup in 1980 to 1983
attempted to stop the Kurdish resistance at all costs which left
Kurdish women vulnerable. Sahin described an interview she had
with a Kurdish woman named Hafize Ipek on July 21, 2009. Ipek,
“a member of the Municipal Council of Yenisehir, Diyarbakir, was
a university student in the 1980s and was detained for 36 days. ‘I
was humiliated because of my gender and my ethnic identity. I was
tortured with beating and electric shocks. I was abused
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psychologically’.”49 The experiences of the state and the Kurdish
cultural oppressions influenced the women into action by
legitimizing Kurdish ethnic nationalism. The result of liberating
gendered customs of their experienced “double oppression” was
the belief that by “emancipating themselves through collective
action and mass mobilization in the Kurdish nationalist
movements, such that, the Kurdish nation and women would be
liberated simultaneously.”50 The experienced double oppression
refers to the cultural or religious oppression and the state or village
oppression. The Kurdish female movement was a way to legitimize
their rights as equals in gender relations through acceptance within
their involvement of activism.
Women began to assume the role of activist by joining the
PKK out of necessity for numbers in recruitment as Kurdish
women traditionally had many restraints within their villages. For
the reason that PKK members were being jailed and killed in high
numbers, they were not allowed to roam the villages alone or to
socialize with men without a guardian. This made it difficult for
the women to meet the PKK fighters. The PKK was not active in
the cities, thus resulting in the lack of women recruits in the 1980s.
The change occurred in 1989, when the PKK created roads into
colleges and urban areas. The Kurdish group began to publish on
politics in the 1990s, and gained the attention of women. This
activity was seen as socially tolerable to family members with
reference to office work being preferred to mountain fighting. The
Kurdish community was astonished to find women guerrilla
fighters carrying guns into villages at night to create propaganda
and assemble goods.51
The allowance of women to join the Kurdish nationalist
struggle was intended to enable Kurdish independence whereas
women egalitarianism for the PKK came second. The Kurdish
locals in eastern Turkey linked female modesty to the honor of the
land by producing more Kurdish people to expand and honor a
49
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Kurdistan to justify sending daughters to fight. In turn, the
combination created a wider nationalist situation for the Kurdish
people, specifically the women. Many Kurds in Turkey view the
Kurdish populations in terms of kinship. As seen in the examples
above, mothers are known as mother of the nation, and PKK
members are seen as sons and daughters of the nation. The control
of female cadres by male party members can be seen as a
“framework of nationalist forms of kinning,” which is essential for
young unmarried women joining the party.52 Weiss writes about an
interview with a party official who spoke of the strict rules
regarding modesty of female recruits:
If we do not make sure that we respect local values
and show that we protect the women and their
honor, parents would decline sending their
daughters to us.’…Parents often agree to their
daughters’ political activities exactly because “the
party is us” the community, where the same
standards of modesty and honor are enacted as at
home.53
Many of the Kurdish people residing in their villages of
Turkey still practice patriarchal religious structures in their
communities linked to old tendencies of past tribal life when
kinship was an important tool to survival.
In the 1990s, women’s roles began to change after a
military coup. “Tens of thousands of Kurdish men”54 were put in
prison and forced women to take charge of the societal familial
role. They became responsible for feeding their families and dealt
with a challenging government in regards to Turkey’s legal and jail
systems. This meant that the women were often times brutalized
52
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when dealing with guards or police. This helped to foster the
revolutionary ideals growing within the Kurdish women.
Three interviews of women involved with the PKK had
different experiences in reference to Turkish treatment in prison.
The article by Nerina Weiss entitled, “Falling from Grace: Gender
Norms and Gender strategies in Eastern Turkey,” outlines the
experiences and how the experiences interact with the idea of
gender equality. The first woman, Fatma was a young woman
married to a male Kurdish activist. She attended special political
events but the responsibilities and expectancies of marriage
generally mark an end to a woman’s political career. At this time,
Fatma had two young children and was pregnant when her husband
was arrested. She had to watch her husband beaten and was not
allowed to get properly dressed. The soldiers’ were able to see her
exposed in her nightgown and she felt this was as violent as her
husband’s beating. Her husband was taken away and sentenced to
multiple years in prison. She went to visit him but, was disgraced
by male guards who strip searched her. After the birth of her third
child, she resumed visits and used the baby’s diapers to smuggle
through letters about the Kurdish movements.55
The Turkish soldiers used sexualized acts as transgressions
in the way of demoralizing or to humiliate the Kurdish society as a
whole. There were many reports of women being targeted by
removing their respected female status and violating their moral
code and conservative manner. The tactic not only afflicted the
husband and wife, but also the Kurdish people. Kurdish and
Turkish women share the same societal attitudes, as Muftuler-Bac
states: “Mediterranean culture…is based on male superiority and
female inferiority. This is reproduced by women themselves as
mothers and mothers-in-law.”56
The Turkish soldiers as noted used the sexual defilement of
Kurdish women as a weapon of war to symbolically demoralize
and degrade the Kurdish society. It is through this narrative that
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one might better understand the PKK’s control over the women by
allowing the women agency to protect themselves and end Turkish
attempts to humiliate Kurdish society. Weiss perfectly connected
the symbolic meaning of sexual violation to the act of war when
she states: “The physicality of the ethicized body can hardly be
separated from the symbolic meanings vested in it. In Kurdish
communities, military and the police often very consciously
violated local perceptions of good and evil, codes of modest
conduct, and purity and pollution. As in most conflicts, these
violations were highly gendered and sexualized.”57
The second interview of a female activist was of a mother
who was treated radically different than Fatma. This provides great
insight to the gender role hierarchy. Handan is an older woman
with grown children. Her daughter became involved with the PKK,
which led to her home being searched regularly. Handan and her
husband were taken into interrogation many times. She was
interrogated as a parent and not a wife. She did not experience
humiliating situations; rather her elderly position demanded her
respect from the interrogators. She enjoyed more societal freedom
because she was older. She was less likely to be sexually harassed
and was seen as genderless. This allowed older women a higher
familial, political, and social status. Handan later went looking for
her daughter in the mountains. When she found her daughter she
stayed with her for a few days. While visiting, the young women
began to call her mother. She became the mother of their unit.
Handan stated describing her time with the unit that, “these
guerrilla fighters were not strong heroes: they seemed far too
young, fragile and longing for their mothers.58
The third interview with the former guerilla fighter known
as Zehra was a member of the Democratic Society Party
(Demokratik Toplum Partisi, DTP). Weiss’s study displays a
female fighter that broke the rule of the party’s ban on romantic
relationships. Zehra grew up in a small Kurdish community in
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eastern Turkey. Her village had been politically active in the
Kurdish resistance, in turn influencing Zehra’s involvement. She
was imprisoned for ten years, but after her release became a highranking cadre in the DTP. In Zehra’s position, the party enlisted
her the task of reviewing the local political structure and to clean
out the ranks of those who lacked the Kurdish cause. Her
judgments were highly respected giving her the right to criticize
the community and party officials. Zehra was respected but
unpopular for her harsh reproach of many high-ranking party and
community members accusing them of using the party for personal
gain and in opposition to the purity of the Kurdish fight.
Zehra held a high position in the party structure and was
known as the queen (Kralice) from her effectiveness in the party.59
As firm as she was on the dealings of local officials she opposed
the structure of the strict rules against romantic relationships of
party members. Zehra believed that a member could be a
committed to the party and have a personal life. She was also
offended by her ascribed identity as an “erkek-kadin, meaning a
man-woman.”60 Being a trusted member of the party, Zehra was
able to socialize alone with male members without the start gossip.
On one of the outings, the male member received a phone call
from his girlfriend and became upset that he was out with a female
cadre alone. The male member calmed his significant other by
stating it was fine because Zehra was a erkek-kadin. The term
meant there was no sexual desire for the male member because
Zehra was basically seen as a man. The two terms ascribed to
female members in the Kurdish parties are defined as, “while a
women addressed as an erkek has the male characteristics of
bravery and self-control, an erkek-kadin transgresses gendered
boundaries and imitates men without having internalized the
necessary (positive) characteristics of a man.”61 The term surprised
her and created the need to discredit that ascribed identity because
Zehra saw herself as a normal woman who wanted marriage and
59

Ibid., 56.
Ibid., 56.
61
Ibid., 72
60

65

Kurdish Women Guerrilla Fighters

children at some point. She challenged the gender roles of the party
structure by frequently claiming her right to familial normalcy
while still maintaining a dedicated role in the party. Zehra differed
from other female fighters who disclaimed a “normal life” of
cultural customs for the contextual gender equality in the Kurdish
resistance. Other female cadres feared the punishments for
resisting the structural identity of asexuality and the rule against
relationships.
The former guerilla fighter organized her marriage to a
prominent political activist in the party to begin her family. The
marriage created a major disturbance within the party and led to
the removal of both Zehra and her husband from their positions in
the DTP. The former queen “was accused of disloyalty, betrayal,
and treason.”62 She was initially sentenced to death for her offense,
but the decision was altered to her expulsion from the party and
society. However, Zehra’s husband received less scrutiny and
punishment as he was welcomed back into the party, but denoted
in rank.
The three experiences begin to explain why the Kurdish
women join the PKK. Many join to escape the repressive life of
their Kurdish villages, but are stripped of their gender identity and
given a new form of an “emancipated gender.” Once a woman is
involved with the PKK they are no longer seen as a woman, but
referred to as a man. They lose all ties to femininity and are seen as
asexual. If captured by Turkish soldiers the female fighters no
longer had the gendered title as female. If Turkish soldiers
attempted to humiliate or demoralize the Kurdish culture with the
captive, it would no longer work. To diminish the sexuality of
female fighters to that of no gendered identity strips their worth as
a reproducing mother of the Kurdish people and in a sense lose
their importance to the Kurds as someone that needs protection.
Overtime the Kurdish women filled positions of branched
organizations of the PKK such as the ERNK (The Kurdish
People’s Liberation Front), political networks, and the Kurdish
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Parliament in Exile military activities. The membership offshoots
that aided the PKK worked in and around European countries to
establish awareness for the Kurdish problem in Turkey by creating
propaganda and intelligence activities, street demonstrations, and
media support. Many women joined the armed struggle and were
openly accepted. The female fighters were instrumental to the PKK
because women were able to bypass the security inspection points
in Turkey with ease. Sahin in an interview with Ali Kemal Ozcan
in 2007, received the following answer to why women were
accepted into the armed fight, “female militants often have better
access to certain targets, such as police control points, public
gatherings, and parades. In addition, women launched suicide
attacks more easily than men. During the 1990s, the PKK launched
15 suicide attacks, 11 of them by women.”63
Conclusion
The brief background to Kurdish history set the foundation to the
understanding of Kurdish people’s right to exist as their own
nation and culture. The Kurdish people are one of the oldest ethnic
and cultural groups to the Middle East. The Kurds have co-existed
for centuries with various civilizations and received little
opposition to how they should live. It was the entrance of
European imperialism that altered the Middle Eastern inhibitors
and the Kurdish way of life. The alterations of the old practices to
the western principles of economy, ideology, racism, secularism,
the false promises of the world wars, and nationalism vastly
changed the Middle East and are directly responsible for the
current conflicts. The history also displayed the religious
background that divided the Kurds and assisted in the inequality of
women in their societal structure. The female fighters of the PKK
and other Kurdish factions state that they fight in the resistance to
gain a sovereign Kurdistan, but to also bring gender egalitarianism
in the Kurdish communities. Many Kurdish communities follow
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their religious or cultural customs of male dominance that restrict
women in their societies. The young Kurdish women are subjected
to be slaves to men as Mitra later stated in her interview. Females
are restricted in their movement through the villages by needing a
familial male chaperon, they have limited access to education, and
many suffer from arranged marriages. The arranged marriages by
male family members take away physical ownership and rights to
the women’s bodies. Many Kurdish women in Turkey and
throughout the Middle East as noted, experienced abusive
husbands, honor killings, and rape which clarifies the Kurdish
females need to join the PKK and gain some equality or ownership
over themselves.
The formation of Turkey by Ataturk was a monolithic
alteration to the Kurdish people and their identity. Ataturk’s
reforms attempted to strip the Kurdish identity from Turkey
through legal and violent force. A major key factor that pushed the
Kurdish response was the reform of education and later gender
equality. The educational reforms altered the thinking of the Kurds
by granting them a western knowledge. The Kurds were able to
implement western thought to evoke ideology and nationalism that
they were now ready to effectively fight for because they
understood the power behind both ideas. The gender equality
reforms greatly affected the Kurdish women through legal gender
rights. Many Kurdish women in rural villages were not affected by
the new laws, but it set the standard that made a lasting effect on
Apo’s PKK by including women in the fight. The main goal for
Apo was to gain numbers and to eliminate the backwardness of the
patriarchal customs by becoming emancipated into a new form of
women-hood. The PKK utilized the methods of striping the past
much like the Kemalist reforms attempted.
The formation of the Kurdish resistance in response to
Ataturk’s reforms that intended to create one cultural Turkish
identity is essential to the female fighters. The PKK background
allows for an understanding of Kurdish agency against their
cultural genocide, but also sets the foundation for the inclusion of
female fighters. Although, the female guerilla fighters are still
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restricted by male dominance, they enjoy more freedom in the
PKK compared to their life in the villages.
Female involvement in various Kurdish resistance
movements allows for the possibility of liberation and
empowerment from otherwise restrictive gender roles in rural
Kurdish villages. Women that join the resistance gain self-worth
and can negotiate their position within Kurdish communities. They
are able to utilize their political positions to protect themselves
from the daily constraints of honor and shame from their local
communities and threats from Turkish forces. The party represents
empowerment as a process for women to have control over their
lives and decisions. Many interviews with the female fighters do
not consider themselves at a disadvantage or in need of saving;
instead they compare their old life of restraints to bolster the
validation of their new social and political opportunities.
At first glance, the members of the PKK seem to share the
same restrictions in the party structure of no sexual or marital
relations. A closer view of the restrictions show that romantic
relationships of male guerilla fighters is severely frowned upon
and if caught, a demotion in rank is the punishment. On the other
hand, the female guerilla fighters receive major repercussions for
breaking the rules. The women’s punishments vary depending on
the area, but the most extreme is a death sentence. For many
women cadres the punishments are more likely to be elimination of
membership to the party and to be ostracized by the PKK and the
Kurdish communities. The main contributor to the harsh
punishments for females is to make the example that sexual
relations for women will not be tolerated to keep families in the
villages secure in trusting the PKK with their daughters honor. The
female fighters within the party structure enjoy the freedoms of
guerilla life even with their conditional equality.
Abdullah Öcalan was captured in 1999 and brought to
Turkey. Öcalan was sentenced to death, but the sentence was
altered to life imprisonment. The leading members of the PKK
halted the violence to a low point. Attacks reemerged when the
Iraqi Kurds obtained an Independent State in 2006. This echoed
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the long awaited achievement of a Kurdish fight for autonomy.
The possession of cultural independent home drove the Turkish
Kurds to hope for their own Independent Kurdistan.
Conflict between the Turkish Kurds and Turkey is an
ongoing dispute. Determining a solution to the situation is difficult
because the opposing sides use hostile actions to gain control. In a
recent development, On March 21, 2013, Öcalan called out to the
PKK to cease fire. According to the Turkish Government, Öcalan
and Turkish leaders have been in negotiations to give the Turkish
Kurds cultural rights in the upcoming constitution. Since 2013 to
the present there has been a cease fire for peace talks with Turkey
about Kurdish rights. From July 30th to July 5th, 2013, the PKK
changed its leadership remarkably choosing a male and a female
leader to head the PKK. The duel gendered power base is meant to
create an illusion to the Turkish community that Kurdish women
do receive the same rights and power that male members enjoy.
Both members along with the conference members elected Öcalan
as president and commander of the PKK.64
The gendered violations experienced by the females of the
PKK are doubled by the Turkish military and the unequal
structures of the PKK. The Kurdish women are willing to die to
enjoy a form of freedom in the PKK that they otherwise would not
experience in their Kurdish villages. The Kurdish women around
the Middle East are using their role within the Kurdish resistance
for a new conflict that is unrelated to the sole cause of Kurdistan.
The Kurdish inclusion of women to the fight has allowed for the
opening of a new social setting for women as feminist. As Weiss
stated, “The Kurdish political arena had opened a context for
women to appropriate new space. Women have taken up political
offices and challenged the male dominance within the party
itself.”65 The female guerilla fighters understood the PKK needed
numbers and did not necessarily care about gender egalitarianism,
but recently the women have gained the upper hand. They have
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learned to use the Kurdish card of self-preservation and using
situations to their advantage. Male members of the PKK have also
provided gender equality as a demand in Kurdish independence,
subsequently giving Kurdish women legitimacy. The women have
stepped into the public arena presenting to Kurdish society
throughout the Middle East that they enjoy true equality in the
Kurdish groups. By creating public legitimacy and rallying for
women rights, society leaves an open space for the women to enjoy
more freedoms when the Kurdish resistance is over. They have
proven their right to gender equality by fighting alongside the men
of the PKK and when the fight is over men will not be able to take
female freedoms away. The Kurdish female guerilla fighters have
thus successfully introduced a paradigm for their ultimate
egalitarian ends.
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